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Introduction
Diaoyu Islands are China's, but Guangzhou is ours!
(Diaoyu Dao shi Zhongguo de, er Guangzhou shi WoMen de!)
The territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu 
Islands (the Senkaku Islands in Japanese) in September 2012 
triggered nationwide protests.1 Since Guangzhou was one of 
the main protest sites, thousands of people from other parts of 
China travelled there to launch their campaign against Japan. 
However, the protest turned violent as protesters damaged 
private and business properties in Guangzhou. In responding 
to these disruptions, some local commentators launched a 
Weibo [microblog] campaign to boycott the anti-Japan protest 
to protect Guangzhou from chaos and disruptions. The phrase 
'Diaoyu Islands are China's, but Guangzhou is ours!' was the 
1 Since the focus of this chapter is China, I will use the Chinese term 
'Diaoyu Islands' instead of the Japanese term 'Senkaku Islands'.
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campaign slogan.2 Many Guangzhou's Weibo users were quick to follow by re-posting 
the message to their own networks.
This chapter examines the role of an opinion leader on Sina Weibo who conducted 
the online campaign that countered the nationwide anti-Japan protests in Guangzhou. 
Specifically, I focus on those online practices by the opinion leader and his followers 
which have reproduced the sense of locality of Guangzhou, the southern Chinese city 
near Hong Kong and Macau.
Current literature has established that the communication process in public 
communication is indirectly mediated through a few individuals — opinion leaders — 
who present their knowledge, expertise and authorities over the issue at hand in order 
to facilitate public engagement and participation (Katz 1957; Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; 
Gökçe et al. 2014). However, Sassen (2011, p. 574) argues that contemporary political 
practices are increasingly related to 'the production of "presence"'. In other words, the 
formation of the publics and the reproduction of place are intricately connected, and 
this spatial-public dialectic redefines the role of opinion leader in the digital era. After 
determining one local media commentator as the opinion leader during the event, I 
ask two specific things. First, how did the opinion leader exploit Weibo's platform 
and Guangzhou's inhabitants' experience of place in order to construct himself as a 
spatial subject rather than merely as a 'political leader'? Second, how did he mobilise 
his Weibo followers to 're-make' Guangzhou during a period of hypernationalism in 
China?
In order to develop the line of inquiry that connects opinion leader, locality and 
digital media, I draw on the relational characteristic of place to examine Guangzhou's 
experience: the meaning of the city is undergoing constant rebuilding and changes. 
Because of factors such as Guangzhou's economic role in facilitating China's economic 
reforms since the late 1970s (Vogel 1989) and its geocultural affiliation with Hong 
Kong (Fung & Ma 2002) and the overseas Chinese communities (Faure 2007), the 
city has developed a distinctive local identity. These factors guide my analysis in the 
following ways. First, I provide a conceptual discussion about the notion of place and 
city below. Specifically, I draw on an interdisciplinary approach to develop a framework 
that focuses on the digital formation of local place in China. Following that, I frame the 
anti-Japan demonstrations in relation to Weibo use, and locate the social controversies 
caused by the demonstrations against China's asymmetric spatial arrangements. I then 
make a brief note on the research methods I have used. Finally, I discuss the role of the 
opinion leader in facilitating the sense of locality and place in Guangzhou.
2 This phrase was used by local mainstream media including the state-run Guangzhou 
Daily, which used this phrase in their official Weibo account on 18 September 2012 
(http://www.weibo.com/1887790981/yCoKg96PI?from=page_1002061887790981_
profile&wvr=6&mod=weibotime&type=comment#_rnd1474524387853) to call for 
rationality and calmness in the anticipated anti-Japan demonstrations in Guangzhou.
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City, place — A brief overview
This chapter builds on two conceptual premises to develop an interdisciplinary 
approach. First, I draw on cultural geographers' concept of relational ontology to 
emphasise the pluralistic and transformative natures of a geographic place — such 
as that of Guangzhou. This is not new, as geographers generally conceive that a place 
has to be understood in relation both to its broader structural transformations (Relph 
1976; Harvey 1969, 1989; Castells 1989, 2009), and to people's bodily practices and 
daily routines (de Certeau 1984; Kekou 2013). The intellectual origin I draw upon 
here is therefore similar to Kennedy et al.'s emphasis on the processual qualities of 
place as discussed in their chapter in this book (Chapter Twelve), seeing place as a 
site of discourse contestation and power interactions. In other words, even though a 
place is geographically fixed, its meanings shift over time. Second, I also accept that 
the communication process is mediated and filtered through a few individuals — 
opinion leaders (Katz & Lazaersfeld 1955). Opinion leaders present their knowledge, 
expertise and authorities over the issue at hand in order to enact public engagement 
and participation (Wright 2006; Dubois & Gaffney 2014).
These two approaches intertwine with each other in the sense that while they 
can complement each other's limitations, in doing so they also critically expand the 
conceptualisation of collective actions in a digital era. First, the study of geography is 
an inquiry into the multiple communicative processes that produce and disseminate 
geographic knowledge. Since public communication is always mediated by a small 
number of individuals, the dissemination of geographic knowledge has likewise always 
been processed by a handful of individuals/institutions — through, for example, 
textbooks, mass media and other cultural and social institutions. In the case of China, 
geographic knowledge and information are either mediated by social institutions such as 
school (Judge 2002), or by online communities (Wang 2015), or by grassroots creative 
artists (Liu  &  Cai 2014). In the same vein, communication facilitated by opinion 
leaders is spatially defined. These individuals exert their authority and influence in 
relation to the social experience and cultural expression of the physical place. The 
knowledge and expertise of any given opinion leader are not universally applicable 
or recognised. In other words, opinion leaders are not merely political figures who 
represent a certain class ideology; they are essentially spatial subjects who narrate the 
lived experience for — and to — a spatially defined audience.
By synthesising the two approaches in relation to China, I am informed by 
William Hurst's (2008) study on Chinese laid-off workers' collective actions. In 
learning about the framing and discourse used by the protest leaders of laid-off 
workers' movements across China, Hurst (2008) identifies three different regional 
political economies (regional frames) which are used to mobilise and frame collective 
actions. As a result, the modes of action and the ways that protesters perceive potential 
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gains or costs in seeking redress also differ across China. Hurst (p. 86) points out that 
'specific lived experience of otherwise unconnected individuals shapes worldviews in 
important ways'. In other words, there are no universal 'working-class struggles' across 
China; instead, protest leaders in different regions 'localise' their framing rhetoric to 
enact different modes of collective movements, which carry different sets of demands 
and pursuits.
Hurst's study is telling, as it indicates that opinion leaders do not merely 
incite shared class-grievances; they 're-map' local people's collective memories and 
knowledge of the physical place to determine the mode, requirements and tactics of 
their actions. Henceforth, it seems as though any collective action is essentially an 
embodying process that encapsulates the experiential dimension of a place (Prieto 
2011). Since the experience of place 'can be either real or imagined', the meanings of 
a physical place are being 'constantly reinterpreted and reclassified' (Sen & Silverman 
2014, p. 3). In the same vein, de Certeau (1984, p. 93) states that a city is 'defined 
and created' by its citizens' mundane everyday practices. 'Walking', for example, is an 
elementary form of physical motion which we practise to experience the city (p. 94). 
Such bodily movements and physical motions map our knowledge of, and personal 
networks within, the spatial structure (de Certeau 1984) and bring us into different 
places (Casey 1993).
To think about de Certeau's illustration of the bodily mapping of a city in a 
digital context would require some clarification. While it is true that these embodiment 
practices are now increasingly 'digitised' (Kekou 2013), to simply conceive that digital 
media have provided the 'space' (Zheng 2007) and the 'resources' (Eltantawy & Wiest 
2011) for us to perform these practices is problematic. It might instead be worth 
considering how digital media enact new bodily practices that enrich and complicate 
the embodiment of geography (Farman 2012). Digital media have primarily subsumed 
some of the duties of our bodies in mapping and making places — duties such as 
walking. The navigation and imagination of the physical location are increasingly 
expressed through the transmission and dissemination of data in the form of textual 
and audiovisual materials (Graham, Zook & Boulton 2012). However, these data are 
locally specific as our bodily practices, spatial movements and physical motions in the 
material world continue to define, characterise and attach meanings to these digital 
representations.
The digitisation of embodiment will facilitate new interpretations, dynamics 
and cultural understanding, thus inventing new bodily practices to be performed 
and carried out in a physical sense. These practices, as Farman (2012, p. 36) puts it, 
dissolve our sense of the virtual into the material world; they enact what he terms 
as 'the transformation of space into place', so that the virtual representations (re)
produce our actual sense of the physical surroundings (p. 40). Farman (2012) links 
his arguments to Casey's notion of emplacement (1993), which emphasises the 
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'situational characteristics' of our sense of place. In other words, information is non-
transferrable universally (Farman 2012, emphasis in the original, p.  42) but we (as 
social agents) 'contextualise' the information in accordance with different situations. 
The job of contextualising the knowledge and information rests on the shoulder of 
opinion leaders. As discussed, public communication is always mediated through the 
opinion leader who needs to renarrate and reproduce the sense of a place in order to 
foster the collective bodily practices of place remaking.
China's spatial politics and the anti-Japan demonstrations
The event of anti-Japan demonstrations was a result of a series of diplomatic disputes 
between China and Japan over the maritime sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, offshore 
of Taiwan, in 2012. The tipping point came as the Japanese government issued a formal 
statement claiming its acquisition of three of the islands in the region on 11 September 
(Fujimura 2012). The timing, however, coincided with the anniversary of the Mukden 
Incident — Japan's conquest of part of northeast China on 18 September 1931, which 
marked the beginning of its invasion of China during World War II. In 2012, Chinese 
people took their anger to the internet to call for street protests. In responding to the 
online campaign, more than 60 000 people staged protests at more than twenty-eight 
major Chinese cities (including Hong Kong) on 15 September (BBC Chinese 2012). 
However, many people did not protest in their local city but travelled to different 
major cities to voice their anger, one of those cities being Guangzhou.
Although the protests were initially peaceful, they later turned violent, as some 
protesters allegedly committed violent acts, including smashing Japanese-brand cars, 
shop fronts and even stealing properties from Japanese-owned shops. In Guangzhou, 
major business districts became paralysed and public transportation experienced major 
disruptions due to the protest and its related violent activities (Spegele & Nakamichi 
2012). Protesters threw rocks to smash the windows of the luxury and heritage Garden 
Hotel because it hosts the Japanese consulate (Wu 2012).
While the issue in contention was that the protesters had seriously disrupted 
the lives and social order of Guangzhou, the city has a long history of struggle with 
the central state governed by the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] over the issues 
of cultural identity and geosubjectivity (Faure 2007; Wang 2015). China has one 
of the world's oldest and most enduring systems of territorial hierarchy, which can 
be dated back to the Han Dynasty (from 206 BC to 220 AD); this hierarchy was 
arranged vertically to ensure that imperial decrees and central policy guidelines were 
disseminated throughout the district, the county and the township (Oakes & Schein 
2006; Wang 2005). Such a spatial arrangement aims to 'prevent power from slipping 
from centre to the periphery' (Whitney 1970 in Wang 2005, p. 10). The CCP then 
adopted this spatial administrative and ruling philosophy when it came to power in 
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1949. A Chinese local place is deemed to serve the agenda and interests of the national 
subject, rather than being able to assert its own subjectivity (Judge 2002).
In the case of Guangzhou, since the city is the 'transferring terminal' for millions 
of migrant workers moving to the Pearl River Delta region (Vogel 1989), the rapid 
economic and demographic changes underpin constant social tensions between locals 
and outsiders over employment, social security and even family stability (Cheung 2002). 
Further, Guangzhou's geolingual proximity with Hong Kong also ensures that it has 
developed a distinct local identity for itself. However, local identity can be problematic 
for the CCP, as it can fall outside of the agenda of nation building and nationalism. 
This was evident, for example, when the government attempted to abolish Cantonese 
broadcasting on television in 2010 (Wu 2010). The proposal triggered thousands 
of citizens of Guangzhou to protest on the street (2010). The CCP's cultural policy 
over time is a form of displacement (Relph 1976), which refers to the conquering 
of place as modernity displaces traditional folk traditions. In contrast, the formation 
of a place-centric identity and the project to renarrate those places are examples of 
efforts to counter what de Certeau (1984, p. 161) terms the expansion of the '"techno-
structural" urban landscape'. In doing so, the geo-embodying process provides the 
moral justifications (purpose) and the contextual knowledge (information) needed 
to operationalise collective practices and movements (Farman 2012), which both are 
facilitated by, and enable the emergence of, opinion leaders.
A note on method
I collected two sets of Weibo posts as data from Guangzhou between 15 September and 
18 September 2015 — during and after the weekend of the anti-Japan demonstrations. 
The first set of data helped to determine opinion leader(s), as I had little knowledge 
about who the individual(s) would be at the time of research. The second set of data 
helped me to gain insights into the opinion leader's practice and his interactions with 
followers in mapping Guangzhou's local values and identity.
I collected the first set of data through searching for two different but related key 
phrases:
1. 'Guangzhou is ours' (广州是我们的) — this was the campaign slogan
2. 'Anti-Japan' (抗日) — this was a broader reference to the incidents at the 
time.
I utilised Weibo's advanced search function, which offers the filtering options of 
'time range' and 'location' to generate those Weibo entries from Guangzhou posted 
from 15 September to 18 September 2012. I retrieved 15 766 entries (original posts 
and comments) by searching the first key phrase and 4412 posts (original posts 
and comments). I followed established typologies which focus on the regularity of 
posting (Graham & Wright 2013) and the response rate in the forms of 're-post' and 
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'comments' (Cha et al. 2010; Bruns & Burgess 2012) at a particular time and space 
(an event) to determine the authority and potential influence of individuals. In relation 
to Weibo, Zhang and Pentina (2012, p. 316) further state that opinion leaders should 
display strong awareness of civic rights to provide moral judgments to controversial 
issues. This of course, relates to China's one-party political structure and the limited 
freedom of political expression (King, Pan & Roberts 2013).
By following these typologies, I determined that Chen Yang, a local media 
commentator, was the opinion leader during the anti-Japan demonstrations in 
Guangzhou. He has 267 414 followers3 and posted regularly during the anti-Japan 
demonstration weekend — thirty-five entries in total, or more than eight entries per 
day. Excluding the most popular entry (posted at 02:45am on 16 September 2012), 
his entries on average were re-posted 2462 times and received 195 comments during 
the research period. These figures outperformed the average number of re-posts (7.5 re-
posts) and comments (20.6 comments) of other opinion leaders in the data. Further, 
Chen's most well-received entry was re-posted 44 211 times, receiving 210 'likes' 
and 9615 replies (comments). In other words, this post alone accounts for more than 
50 per cent of the total number of re-posts and comments in the dataset.
Having determined Chen as the opinion leader, I generated the second set 
of data by collecting all of his thirty-five entries during the research period. I then 
specifically focused on the fifteen entries he posted on 18 September 2012, the peak of 
the nationwide demonstrations. On average, each entry was re-posted more than 418 
times and received more than 195 comments. I also collected all of the 9615 replies to 
the most well-received entry in order to examine the interactions between Chen and 
his followers. The remainder of this chapter discusses my major findings in relation 
to the formation of Chen as a spatial subject and his role in facilitating the bodily 
practices of remaking Guangzhou on Weibo.
Discussion
As the purpose of this chapter is to understand Chen's role in facilitating the formation 
of a local public through the reproduction of the place of Guangzhou during the 
controversies of the hypernationalistic sentiment in 2012, it is important to unpack 
the nature of an opinion leader in relation to Weibo's platform. Chen's status as an 
opinion leader was both platform-orientated and socially constructed. Since its launch 
in 2009, Weibo has been a 'celebrity forum' that preferences the views and opinions 
of established and well-known public figures (Wang 2015). Weibo has both verified 
and non-verified users. Verified accounts (V-accounts) affirm the social status and 
political power (both mainstream and grassroots) of certain individuals. Such accounts 
have gone through an identity verification process by submitting proof of identity 
3 As of 23 April 2016, when I accessed his blog <http://weibo.com/fm1052chensir>.
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(China's Identity Card, a passport, or documentation that proves the legitimacy of 
an organisation) to Weibo in order to be endorsed, and thus are generally perceived 
as more trustworthy (Huang & Sun 2014). The views expressed, and the information 
provided, by V-accounts normally attract more online traffic and attention than non-
verified accounts. Consequently, V-accounts generally have more followers than non-
verified accounts (Huang & Sun 2014). This fosters a culture on Weibo in which users 
are inclined to 'follow' established public figures (Zhang & Pentina 2012).
However, Weibo users are highly selective in the V-accounts they follow. Chen's 
Weibo posts during the research period actually outperformed the entries posted by 
such public accounts as the local police (@GZpolice), news outlets and other verified 
individual accounts. This is probably because Chen has been critical of the mainstream 
establishments in China, which is consistent with the view that an opinion leader 
generally works outside of the mainstream political institutions (Gökçe et al. 2014).
Chen's perceived detachment from the establishment relates to his ongoing efforts 
to construct himself as a spatial, local subject of Guangzhou rather than as a loyal media 
personality who follows the party line. In other words, Chen's status as an opinion 
leader is socially constructed and culturally embedded. This is illustrated through 
his Weibo account name, 'Guangzhou Chen Yang', which explicitly emphasises his 
association with the local city as part of his online persona. Chen's 'offline' reputation 
of being a critic of the local and state government's wrongdoings over time (RFA 
2009) further reinforces his subversive persona. Chen hosts current affair programs at 
Guangzhou Television and writes columns for the Southern Metropolis Daily — one of 
the most well-known news outlets pursuing investigative journalism in China (Zhao 
2008). He generally conducts his television programs in Cantonese instead of in the 
official Mandarin. This is in defiance of Article 21 of the State Administration of Radio, 
Film, and Television [SAPPRFT] code, which asserts that 'broadcasting hosts shall 
be the role model to actively promote the popularization of Mandarin, use standard 
and correct form of written Chinese, and defend the integrity of the motherland's 
spoken and written language' (Liu 2004). Chen's defiance not only reinforces his 'non-
establishment' status but also allows him to facilitate the formation of a geopublic 
through the transmission and circulation of his Cantonese broadcasting.
As a result, Chen has received widespread public support in Guangzhou, with 
many Guangzhou citizens calling him 'Chen Sir'. The English word 'Sir' means 
'teacher' and 'mentor', which, in contemporary Cantonese, is an expression of respect. 
Public support for Chen was evident when there was speculation that he had been axed 
from his regular television program because of making critical remarks against party 
officials (RFA 2009). In response to the development, thousands of posters with the 
phrase 'Chen Sir, I support you!' suddenly appeared across Guangzhou's streets and 
online forums (Southern Weekly 2009) in support of him.
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By thinking of Chen as a spatial subject, whose authority and expertise are 
locally defined and embedded in Guangzhou's geography, we can understand his 
Weibo presence through the perspective of emplacement. As previously mentioned, 
the formation of a public is closely related to the creation of people's collective sense 
of geo-belonging. This involves the integration of bodily practices and digital media 
use. As I collected all of Chen's Weibo entries during the anti-Japan demonstrations 
weekend (15-18 September 2012), it became obvious to me that Chen mapped the 
spatial progressions and movements of the anti-Japan demonstrations on Weibo.
On 18 September at 19:03, for example, Chen posted: 'Just walked past some mass 
gatherings, and saw that people were communicating with each other through some 
walkie-talkie devices … [T]hey were all speaking in Mandarin!'4 Later on, at 19:35, he 
re-posted a Weibo update from the Guangzhou police's Weibo account stating that 'a 
large crowd was gathering in the area near the zoo (a central city area), causing traffic 
delays'. Chen added his comments in the re-posting: 'Please beware and co-operate 
with the traffic police's jobs. Pray for our city!' Later on in the evening, at 20:33, he 
posted: 'Our [Guangzhou's] police have finished the cleanup of the demonstrations 
areas, which should put an end to the whole thing! Good job!' Towards the end of the 
evening, at 21:04, Chen questioned the demonstrations:
So these protest brigades have been marching from Huanshidong Road [the main 
drive way in the western district] to Tianhe [an eastern district], circulating the 
entire Guangzhou. They created so much traffic chaos and inconveniences; can't 
they just stay at one place so we can express patriotism [aiguo] and live normally 
[shenghuo] at the same time?
These entries not only illustrate Chen's active presence on Weibo, but also show 
that in posting his entries he was effectively mapping Guangzhou in relation to the 
events. His entries became the new 'maps' of Guangzhou, which provided guidance 
and direction for locals to help them live through unexpected changes in their situation. 
These entries also underpinned Chen's strong awareness of the particular affordances 
Weibo has as a platform. While re-posting is a common feature that users (including 
Chen) used to disseminate news and information, it is worth noting that Chen has 
also made use of Weibo's portable feature (available as an app on smart phones) to 
maintain his regular posting. This is evident from the data as Weibo posts contain 
information on 'posting source' (laiyuan). Three out of the five entries mentioned 
above were posted via Chen's smart phone, and eighteen out of his thirty-five entries 
(over the research period) were posted via his smart phone.
We can thus contend that Chen's 'on-the-move' style of Weibo posting during 
the anti-Japan demonstrations constructs what McQuire (2008, pp. 146-7) calls 'the 
4 Chen's posts were originally written in Chinese. All translations in this chapter are provided 
by the author of this chapter.
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mobile public'. The public no longer stays at a specific location but has the flexibility to 
'move' with the temporal and spatial developments of the events (the demonstrations) 
and the issues (the chaos and disruptions). This is not to say that the public becomes 
placeless; to the contrary, the making of the public now relies on the circulation and 
dissemination of the networks, which are enabled by the bodily practices of posting, 
recording and navigating on Weibo.
In addition to his own online mapping of the demonstration, Chen further utilised 
these techno-bodily practices to interact with his followers. As mentioned elsewhere, 
Chen's most well-received entry from the datasets was posted on 16 September 2012 
at 02:45. The post reads as follows:
Please do not describe those protesters on the street as 'patriots'; they are not 
emotionally charged and doing stupid things (destroying Japanese goods and 
shops in Guangzhou). They in fact knew very well what they were doing, and had 
everything planned in advance. Dear fellow Guangzhouers [jiefang], if any of you 
see them on the street, take a step back and photograph them (as evidence). Let's 
isolate them from the protesting scenes, so we know exactly who they are. Diaoyu 
Islands are China's, Guangzhou is ours. Please be safe, Guangzhou [Guangzhou 
pingan].
In this entry, Chen not only reconstructed the chaotic scenes, which resulted from 
the damage done by the protesters (whom he called the 'fake patriots'), but also called 
upon his followers to 'photograph' those who had caused troubles as a way to defend 
Guangzhou inhabitants' rights and ownership of their hometown.
In order to access his followers' response to these suggestions, I generated a 
sample of 990 posts from the 9615 comments through a systematic sampling method 
(every ninth post is sampled). The words Pai and Zhao (both mean 'photograph') 
were mentioned fifty-four times in the sample. Some Weibo users even made quite 
detailed suggestions about how to take photos of violent protesters. A Weibo user (16 
September 2012) suggested:
Use your smart phone to capture the image of those people; if you can, take a few 
more pictures with an SLR Camera as it can produce higher image quality, showing 
their faces, and then put on the internet for a human flesh search!5
Another user posted at 12:48 on 16 September 2012, agreeing: 'Do not just weiguan 
[surround and look], but take and upload a photo of them, to make their face public, 
to let their friends and family know how ugly their actions are!' Not only have these 
responses reaffirmed Chen's opinion leadership status, but they have also clearly 
responded to his call for action. Such comments illustrate the convergence of Weibo's 
platform features and Guangzhou's society as Chen has effectively exploited Weibo's 
5 Human flesh search (renrou sousuo) is a collective online practice to 'track down offline 
individuals by employing as many computer users as possible in the search' (Herold 2011, 
p. 129).
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functions of visualisation and archiving to gather and foster collective response and 
participation.
The practice of photographing has two layers of implication. First, photographing 
enabled people to visualise Guangzhou's streets in order to provide needed geographic 
information and knowledge about the development of the nationalistic demonstrations. 
Second, the practice of photographing enacted the extended practices of 'archiving' 
and 'searching'. Boyd (2010) identifies four primary affordances of social media: 
persistence, replicability, scalability and searchability. These four types of affordances 
allow textual and audio-visual data to be preserved and transmitted across time and 
space. Photographing, as a bodily practice in a physical place, penetrates these four 
technical affordances of Weibo, as images can be stored (persistence), re-posted and 
shared (replicability) in order to enlarge the visibility of the campaign (scalability). 
Further, the practice of photographing allows extended techno-bodily practices of 
human-flesh search (searchability), as suggested by some of Chen's followers. The 
formation of a Guangzhou public at the time could be what Boyd (2010) calls the 
'networked public', which was enabled by those bodily and digital practices initiated 
by Chen.
The integration between bodily and online practices shows that the virtual and 
the physical are not mutually exclusive but, to use Farman's (2012, p. 46) words, they 
are 'mutually constructed'. The mapping and visualisation of Guangzhou could not 
have happened without Weibo, but Weibo's platform features would have become 
meaningless and irrelevant without the lived experience of the city. Chen therefore did 
not 're-map' Guangzhou himself, but he mobilised his Weibo followers to use their 
physical bodies to remake Guangzhou collectively.
Conclusion: Renarrating China
Despite the anger and discontent evident on Guangzhou's Weibo, it is crucial to clarify 
that there was no suggestion that Guangzhou inhabitants thought anything other than 
that China's territorial ownership of the Diaoyu Islands was correct. In fact, Chen 
and most of his followers on Weibo clearly expressed the very strong view that the 
territorial sovereignty of the islands was critically important in developing a sense of 
pride for the Chinese identity. Hence, the formation of a geopublic in Guangzhou is 
not equivalent to a peripheral identity. Many of those comments in support of Chen's 
suggestion to 'photograph' those irrational protesters made the point that Japan and 
its people would not have suffered, because the shops and cars were the properties 
of Chinese and the Japanese firms employed Chinese people. In other words, the 
process of remapping Guangzhou was not a matter of simply rejecting the overarching 
national identity; instead, it emphasised Guangzhou's local interest in parallel with the 
overarching expression of nationalism.
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The paradoxical treatments of the anti-Japan demonstration in 2012 as expressed 
by Guangzhou Weibo users (including Chen) seemingly illustrate Tilly's (2010) 
account of the 'ambivalent' state-city relation. While individuals living in the city seek 
protection and stability from the state, the state also relies on the resources of the city 
in order to prosper, develop and maintain its ruling legitimacy. The symbiotic relations 
between the two allows ongoing renegotiations to take place, as the two progress 
together in an evolving relational process. This ambivalent state-city relationship might 
have defined Chen's and his followers' practices on Weibo. Recreating Guangzhou 
became a process of renarration of the Chinese nation, thus presenting a vision and an 
interest that are alternative to those imposed by the nation-state.
This chapter has explored Chen's role as an opinion leader on Weibo in facilitating 
the formation of a geopublic in Guangzhou, amid the expansion of the nationalistic 
movement network in 2012. Chen's capacity to manipulate Weibo's technological 
affordances and the lived experience in Guangzhou enabled him, first, to construct 
himself as a spatial subject of the city and, second, to construct a geopublic that 
contested and questioned the legitimacy of a state-imposed notion of nationalism. 
The online practice of (re)posting, archiving, uploading and searching evolved into 
the bodily practices of photographing, observing and mapping the city. Such techno-
bodily embodiment encapsulates Guangzhou's local values on the one hand and the 
national agenda of border sovereignty on the other. It has thus effectively renarrated 
an alternative vision of nationhood, one that differs from the state-imposed version.
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